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Purpose:  Access to appropriate finance is crucial for the start-up, survival, growth and 
development of firms.  The majority of entrepreneurs, especially in smaller firms, are reliant on 
the bank system.  Previous research examines relationships between firms and banks from a 
transaction costs economics and/or agency theory point of view.  This postulates an 
opportunistic base to human behaviour. An alternative set of assumptions about human nature 
encompass altruism and trust. Trust is relevant because it is a way to reduce complexity; it is 
the ‘lubricant’ in exchanges; it is crucial in situations of risk or high pressure, and it is among 
the building blocks of social capital, which have been shown to underpin access to resources for 
entrepreneurs.  Trust is based on an assessment of ability, benevolence and integrity.  This 
paper tests whether there is a relationship between trust and the cost of finance (i.e. interest 
rates). 
Design/Methodology/Approach:  The research is based in North East Italy.  The conceptual 
framework was derived from trust and bank lending literature and was further developed and 
validated through interviews with entrepreneurs and bank managers.  A pilot study, conducted 
in 2004, helped refine the survey instruments and constructs.  A dyadic survey was completed 
in Spring 2005, i.e. we collected data from both banks and firms.  Entrepreneurs were surveyed 
by telephone and bank managers completed a written questionnaire for each firm. The two 
parts of the survey were combined for analysis using a unique identifier. 
Findings:  Factor analysis reduced the trust items into three components representing ability, 
benevolence and integrity.  Multivariate linear regression models tested the influence of the 
three trust factors on interest rates and the amount of credit.  A negative relationship was 
found between ability and integrity and interest rates. In other words, higher levels of trust 
were associated with lower interest rates.     
Implications: Trust is a key element in the entrepreneur – bank relationship, providing the 
opportunity to reduce agency costs. From the bank’s point of view, trust mitigates adverse 
selection and moral hazard, reduces screening and monitoring costs and provides the potential 
for higher profits. For the entrepreneur, it reduces time required to comply with formal 
monitoring exercises and the requirements for collateral.  Trust spirals, in that bestowing trust 
increases trustworthy behaviour.   
Originality/Value:  This paper is unique in assessing the role of benevolence, integrity and 
ability, i.e. the three aspects of trust, on interest rates.  
Key Words: small firms, bank relationships, trust. 
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Introduction 
The financing of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) is the subject of enduring academic and 
political debate (Howorth, 2001). As bank debt is the most common source of external funding 
for businesses of all sizes, and access to bank finance is crucial for entrepreneurs wishing to 
start-up or develop businesses, there is a regular stream of policy and academic research 
investigating debt financing. It has recently come to the fore again with the Basel II agreement. 
Previous research has highlighted the importance of relationships between entrepreneurs and 
banks (Binks and Ennew, 1997; Howorth, Peel and Wilson, 2003) and considers whether 
particular elements of the relationship can reduce agency problems and improve the flow of 
bank funding (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). However, bank relationships are usually examined 
from an economic perspective and the emphasis is nearly always on hard information as a 
means of reducing information asymmetries.  
The basis of much of the previous work is an opportunistic assumption of human behaviour 
(Barney, 1990; Donaldson, 1990). Donaldson (1990) states “the narrow and particular model of 
man in organisational economics of people as cheats and idlers is […] offensive.”  Barney 
(1990) argues that an alternative set of assumptions about human nature that include altruism 
or trust have just as much validity and can be integrated in traditional organisational 
economics. High levels of trust are purported to encourage trustworthy behaviour (Pettit, 1995; 
Nooteboom, 2003).  Trust may therefore play an important role in reducing agency problems 
such as moral hazard and adverse selection.  However, the role of trust in the relationship 
between entrepreneurs and banks has as yet only been alluded to and has not been explored in 
depth. 
Literature on trust argues for its relevance in reducing transaction costs, and agency costs. At 
the same time, literature on relationship lending points out the importance of reducing agency 
problems to improve credit availability, to reduce the cost of credit and reduce the requirement 
for collateral and personal guarantees. Combining these two streams of research leads to our 
main research question: what is the influence of trust in bank lending outcomes for SMEs?  
This paper looks generally at the role of trust in bank lending and then tests whether variables 
which measure different elements of trust are associated with differences in the interest rate 
charged to SMEs.  We focus on a specific region in North East Italy which is viewed as a model 
of economic development.  We examine two sub-regions that are similar economically, 
geographically and socially but have very contrasting banking systems.  South Tyrol has a 
highly concentrated banking system and in some areas there is only one choice of bank, 
whereas Friuli Venezia Giulia has a competitive banking system with a wide choice of local and 
national banks.  Hypotheses were derived from previous conceptual and empirical studies and 
from interviews with entrepreneurs and their bank managers in North East Italy.  The validity of 
constructs and measures was tested in a pilot study.  A dyadic survey was undertaken, in other 
words we questioned both bank managers and entrepreneurs about the same relationship. This 
allows a greater degree of confidence in the validity and interpretation of the results.  
The paper proceeds as follows.  In the next section we examine relevant literature from the two 
streams of bank lending and trust theories.  This is followed by description of the quantitative 
methodology.  The results of our survey are presented next. Finally, we consider the 
implications for entrepreneurs, banks and future research.   
 
Relevant Literature 
Bank Lending 
Whilst the debate regarding the existence of credit rationing is unresolved, it is generally agreed 
that credit rationing is more likely to occur where information asymmetries are highest and that 
small firms in particular are more likely to suffer from informational opacity (Berger and Udell, 
1995).  Information asymmetries in bank-firm relationships (Sharpe, 1990), along with higher 
interest rates or collateral can increase adverse selection situations defined as “a situation in 
which a pricing policy causes only the least desirable customers to do business” (Brealey and 
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Myers, 1991). In the lender-borrower relationship it is a situation in which only the riskier 
entrepreneurs decide to do business because they can accept a higher cost due to riskier – but 
potentially more rewarding – projects. In this way, higher interest rates and collateral pledging 
can increase the riskiness of the portfolio and decrease bank’s profit (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; 
Bester, 1985).   
As the relationship between bank and firm evolves, it is argued that the risk for the bank is 
reduced and the credit availability for the firm increases because information asymmetries are 
reduced (Binks and Ennew, 1997). Earlier works by Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995) and 
Berger and Udell (1995) – both focused on the United States – highlighted that small firms are 
more informationally opaque and therefore their lending process is more deeply affected by 
relationships. Later research, in Europe, (for instance, Angelini et al., 1998; Binks and Ennew, 
1997; Harhoff and Körting, 1998) also suggests that bank relationships are important to small 
firms funding. 
Where bank finance is transaction lending, usually for non-recurrent needs, the decision to lend 
is based on the evaluation of information from financial statements, and/or the provision of 
collateral, and/or credit scoring (Berger and Udell, 2002). These three lending technologies are 
all grounded on hard and public information, available and collected independently from the 
quality of the relationship. Relationship lending is different because it is based on recurrent 
needs (such as line of credit, overdrafts, etc.) and information is gathered beyond the relatively 
transparent data in official documents; information is gathered through a continuous process; 
and information remains confidential to the provider of funds and can be used to make other 
decisions (Berger, 1999).  Relationship lending therefore leverages private information through 
contact over time with the firm, its owner, and its local community on a variety of dimensions 
(Angelini, et al., 1998; Berger et al., 2001; Cole, 1998; Nakamura, 1994).  Private information 
is often soft data which, by definition, is difficult to summarise in a numeric score and is 
influenced by the context in which it is collected (Petersen, 2002). This indicates a central role 
for soft information in the lending process since “the essence of successful lending is 
overcoming asymmetric information problems between the borrower and the lender that would 
otherwise create incentives for borrowers to default their loans” (Goldberg and White, 1998). In 
other words, lenders are aiming to reduce the risk of moral hazard, defined by Brealey and 
Myers (1991) as “the risk that the existence of a contract will change the behaviour of one or 
both parties to the contract” or in this case, where the entrepreneur changes investment 
decisions after collecting the funds.  
We would argue that all the different sources of information are leading up to a decision as to 
whether or not to trust the entrepreneur.  Where trust is low, the general perception of 
riskiness will be greater and interest rates will be higher to compensate for this.  In addition, 
contracts will be more stringent with tight terms and conditions regarding, for example, 
monitoring and collateral. However, trust might be lower due to a lack of soft information or 
because soft information is seen as less credible. This can lead to clumsy blanket solutions 
which fail to discriminate between high and low risk firms.  Such contracts have a high cost to 
banks and do not necessarily guarantee trustworthy behaviour, as we will see from the 
following discussion of theories of trust.   
 
Trust 
Although previous studies have not examined trust in this specific context, there are a number 
of earlier studies on trust which provide indications that it is relevant to the entrepreneur bank 
relationship. Trust is a crucial element of decision making under conditions of complexity (Lewis 
and Weigert, 1985), risk (Weick, 1993) and scarce information (Luhmann, 2000), which is 
exactly the situation faced by banks lending to SMEs.  Higher levels of trust reduce agency 
problems (Ring and Van den Ven, 1992; Wicks et al., 1999; Zaheer et al., 1998), the costs of 
transactions (Macaulay, 1963; Nooteboom et al., 1997; Rooks et al., 2000), the costs of 
monitoring and control (Lewicki and Bunker 1996; Mayer et al., 1995; Zand, 1972), and the use 
of legalistic remedies (Sitkin and Roth, 1993), which indicates that it could reduce costs for 
banks and SMEs.  Trust improves relationships (Gulati, 1995; Fisman and Khanna, 1999; 
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Robinson, 1996; Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998) and cooperation (Jones and George, 1998; Ring and 
Van den Ven, 1994), which would improve information flows and reduce the likelihood of moral 
hazard.  
Trust assumes different forms, which depend on situations, backgrounds and relationship 
histories. Lewicki and Bunker (1996) outline different levels of trust including calculus based 
trust based on rational choice; knowledge based trust based on repeated interaction; and 
identification based trust based on shared values.  Additional or alternative constructs include 
institution based trust (Ring and Van den Ven, 1992) which is based on ex ante deterrents such 
as reputation, support from critical mass, etc.; conditional and unconditional trust (Jones and 
George, 1998); and weak, semi-strong and strong trust (Barney and Hansen, 1994).   
This illustrates that it is important that we define what we mean by trust. There is no such thing 
as a common definition (Hosmer, 1995). Trust is frequently confused with co-operation.  
Although co-operation is often an outcome of trust, they are distinct factors and co-operation 
can exist without trust. It is also important that in the relationship between entrepreneur and 
bank, trust is not confused with situations of “lock in” due to information capturing (Howorth et 
al., 2003).  Mayer, Davis and Schoorman  (1995) provide one of the best and most used 
definitions, which builds on previous work as well as incorporating the non-rational aspects of 
trust.  They state that trust is “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of 
another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important 
to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor and control that other party” Mayer et al. 
(1995). We use this definition of trust. 
As in defining trust, there is no agreed description of how trust is determined.  Jones and 
George (1998) argue that people’s values, attitudes, moods and emotions interact and help the 
initiation, growth and evolution of trust. Initially, trust is expected to be based mainly on 
calculus although some question if this is trust at all. Calculus trust is based on an economic 
calculation (Lewicki and Bunker., 1996), is conditional on future behaviour (Jones and George, 
1998) and may involve contracts.  
As relationships are repeated and norms established, the parties may feel increasingly secure 
(Ring and Van den Ven, 1994) and trust may progress to knowledge-based trust (Lewicki and 
Bunker, 1996), i.e. trust based on predictability that is grounded in the prior knowledge of the 
trustee. Regular communication is needed since trust is strongly based on intense relationship 
and reciprocal testing (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996).  Unconditional (Jones and George., 1998) or 
identification based trust (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996) implies identification with others’ ideas, 
desires, intentions and a strong reciprocal understanding.  Unconditional trust helps the 
development of strong co-operation and supports forms of governance that leverage it: 
psychological contracts can substitute for formal contractual safeguards decreasing the 
likelihood of the termination of the relationship when a breach of commitment occurs (Ring and 
Van den Ven, 1994).  
There is a circular relationship between trust, information, influence and control (Zand, 1972). 
Strong initial trust helps willingness in exchanging accurate and complete information with 
others, allowing another’s influence, and the acceptance of control (i.e. a higher dependence on 
others). These four aspects are not only linked in a sequential looping but also directly reinforce 
one another both increasing and decreasing trust: an entrepreneur who trusts others will 
provide relevant and comprehensive information but when they “encounter low-trust behaviour 
initially, they hesitate to reveal information, reject influence and evade control” (Zand, 1972). 
Interestingly, and of relevance here, when excessive formalisation and controlling activity is 
carried out, distrust emerges and the likelihood of unco-operative behaviour increases (Ring 
and Van den Ven., 1994).  On the other hand, high levels of trust inspire greater 
trustworthiness and lead to a spiralling effect in the development of trust (Nooteboom, 2003).  
Trusting others is dependent on the characteristics of the trustor and more specifically his/her 
propensity to trust others, and the specific characteristics of the situation and/or the target of 
trust (Creed and Miles, 1996).  The propensity to trust is grounded on values and principles that 
are considered intrinsically desirable (Jones and George, 1998) and on a general faith in 
humanity (McKnight et al., 1998). Trust does not operate in a de-contextualized world. The 
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trustor’s perception and interpretation of the context of the relationship affects both the need 
for trust and the evaluation of trustworthiness (Mayer et al., 1995). Context takes into 
consideration the culture in general (Hofstede, 1981), the social constraints (i.e. pressure of 
social rules, conventions, etc.) and institutional constraints (i.e. legal system, institutions, etc.) 
(Hardin, 1996), as well as the environment in general (Bhattacharya et al., 1998).  
Another factor which affects the formation of trust is the risk involved.  There are two aspects 
to risk, probability and size.  In this context probability is the risk that the entrepreneur will act 
opportunistically.  Size refers to the size of loss which would occur should the entrepreneur act 
opportunistically.  Size is only the loss which would affect the bank manager and therefore is 
closely linked to how much responsibility the bank manager has for the downside of their 
lending decisions. 
 
Ability , Benevolence and Integrity 
Trust literature provides a very long list of elements that affect context specific trust formation.  
In this context, relevant factors are those which are expected to influence the bank’s 
assessment of the entrepreneur’s trustworthiness. Mayer et al. (1995), group the factors of 
trustworthiness into ability, benevolence and integrity. Ability looks at aspects such as skills, 
competences, etc. and is domain specific.  Trust based on ability does not necessarily generalise 
to other situations. Ability has repeatedly been shown to be an important factor in the 
assessment of trustworthiness (Butler, 1991; Lewis and Weigert, 1985). The corollary has also 
been evidenced in venture capital investment decisions (Harrison, Dibben and Mason, 1997): 
the most significant barrier to development of trust in this context is the low perceived 
competence of the entrepreneur.  
Benevolence is the extent to which a trustee is believed to voluntarily do good to the trustor. 
Often, benevolence is viewed as relationship specific and more relevant to relationships 
between people rather than organisations. More precisely, there is little opportunity for the firm 
to do good to the bank or to the bank manager. Therefore, the definition of benevolence in 
entrepreneur – bank relationships is extended to a general willingness to voluntarily do good to 
others in line with Nooteboom et al.’s (1997) habitualization. This might be evidenced by 
community involvement, such as charity work, schools, and local politics, which may be linked 
to the perception of shared values.  Benevolence may also extend to looking after employees. 
Integrity is the perception that the trustee adheres to a set of principles considered acceptable 
by the trustor. It is neither relation specific nor context specific but is person specific. Integrity 
(i.e. morality and ethical principles) is not linked to skills or competences (morality is not a 
matter of knowledge or skills) or is it relation specific (morality is over and above each kind of 
specific relationship). Morality and ethical principles are elements of the personal background. 
Nooteboom et al. (1997) identify the same factor when they stress that “one dimension of trust 
is the institutionalisation of values and norms that constitute an ethics of transactional 
relationships” (Nooteboom et al. 1997). According to Sitkin and Roth (1993), higher levels of 
benevolence and integrity decrease distrust because of perceived increases in the congruence of 
values between trustor and trustee.  
The bank manager’s assessment of ability, benevolence and integrity could be based on 
multiple sources of information and might include information from third parties within the 
community, including referrals and gossip.  Harrison et al., (1997) highlight the importance of a 
referral in building initial trust.  Third party sources may provide an assessment of the 
trustworthiness prior to meeting through the reputation which an entrepreneur (or bank 
manager) has in the community. Good reputation increases the possibility of entering a 
relationship because it improves one’s perception of trustworthiness (Dasgupta, 2000). The 
peculiarity of reputation is that it depends on information availability as well as information 
processing and interpretation.  So for example, in the above instance, it is knowledge of 
community involvement rather than community involvement per se which is important. This 
highlights that information flows and interpretation are not under trustee control.  Quite often, 
information may be partial, as third parties may transfer only the information which the other 
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seems to be interested in (i.e. only those which are consistent with their view towards trust or 
distrust).  
Having considered context-specific determinants of trust in the entrepreneur- bank relationship 
we move on now to look at outcomes associated with trust. Various authors (Lewicki and 
Bunker, 1996; Lewis and Weigert, 1985; Mayer, et al., 1995; Ring and Van den Ven, 1992; 
Wicks et al., 1999; Zaheer et al., 1998; Zand, 1972) point out the impact in reducing agency 
costs but do not pay attention to how this reduction happens and there is little formal 
description of the impact of trust on information asymmetries or agency costs. 
The interesting fact is that through leveraging trust a reduction in agency costs can be gained. 
As previously stated (Zand, 1972) trust is evolutionary and information asymmetries, agency 
problems and transaction costs can be reduced thanks to initial trust (but can be also be 
increased because of initial distrust). Leveraging the evolution in the direction of improving and 
developing trust can make both trustor and trustee better off. Furthermore, Rooks et al. (2000) 
find that the less a transaction is embedded institutionally (i.e. based on institutions like law, 
courts, contracts etc.) and the more it is based on trust, the greater is the effort put into the 
transaction. In other words, leveraging trust implies more effort in making a relationship work 
and the greater effort can reduce risk and generate savings in monitoring costs from the 
principal’s (bank) point of view. There is also evidence that trust promotes trustworthy 
behavior, which affects the repayment or default of obligations. This is another circular aspect 
of trust in that bank managers with high levels of trust in an entrepreneur are more likely to 
assist them in not defaulting.  High levels of trust are expected to be associated with increased 
availability of finance and reduce the need for agency risk control mechanisms such as collateral 
and personal guarantees.  Theoretically, the reduction in risk should be reflected in the price of 
finance (interest rate) which is expected to be lower where there are high levels of trust.   
To summarise, the trust which is bestowed on an entrepreneur is expected to be based on an 
assessment of the entrepreneur’s ability, benevolence and integrity.  This process will be 
influenced by the propensity to trust and emotional base of the bank manager, among other 
characteristics. The trust formation process will be influenced by the entrepreneur’s 
characteristics insofar as they are known or understood by the bank manager.  Therefore 
previous interactions, shared values, community involvement, secondary sources of information 
and gossip (third party information) will all influence trust formation.  Outcomes of the process 
are in two stages, the lending outcomes themselves and the behaviour of the entrepreneur 
following the lending decision.  Trust influences ex post behaviour of the entrepreneur indirectly 
through lending outcomes and directly through its positive effect on trustworthy behaviour.  
Thus, high levels of trust are expected to be associated with lower risk, which should be 
reflected in a lower cost of finance. In this paper we test whether there is any evidence of a 
negative association between trust and interest rates.  Measures of trust are derived from 
earlier studies, qualitative interviews and a pilot study.  The following section describes the 
methodology adopted. 
 
Research Method 
As we are examining a relationship between two parties it is important that data are collected 
from both entrepreneurs and bank managers. Previous studies on bank relationships have 
tended to collect data from only one point of view.  We conducted a telephone survey of owner 
managers of SMEs and then their bank managers filled out a postal questionnaire on each firm.   
The study is based in North East Italy, which is an economically successful region in terms of 
contribution to national GDP and is characterised by many small, often family-run, firms, 
sometimes in small industrial clusters (e.g. the Manzano district for chairs or Spilimbergo for 
cutlery). Two different areas of the region (South Tyrol and Friuli Venezia Giulia) were selected 
because they are very similar economically and socially but have contrasting banking systems. 
Both areas are on the Italian border and have a special legal status that gives autonomy to the 
local government.  South Tyrol lies on the Austrian border, is strongly influenced by German 
culture and mainly German speaking. The small cooperative local banks – the focus of this 
study – are called by the German name – Raiffeisenkasse – not the Italian one – Banca di 
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Credito Cooperativo. Friuli Venezia Giulia is an area next to the Austrian and Slovenian border.  
Just as South Tyrol bridges German and Latin cultures, Friuli Venezia Giulia is a bridge between 
Latin, Slav and German cultures. In many ways, the social and economic fabric of the two areas 
is similar. 
The banking systems of the two areas have interesting differences. South Tyrol has a very 
concentrated banking system: two local banks (Sparkasse and Volkbsank) cover all the area 
together with the Raiffeisenkassen. The Raiffeisen system consists of 52 strongly localised very 
small cooperative banks, which totalled 191 branches (Raiffesisenverband Südtirols, 2003). The 
Raiffeisen strategy discourages competition and no two Raiffeisenkassen cover the same area. 
Small firms in South Tyrol will usually have only one choice of local bank. Large national banks 
operate only in the urban areas and target larger firms. This concentrated banking system is 
due to a number of factors, which are peculiar to this region. Firstly, employees need to speak 
German and Italian and all documents must be in both Italian and German.  Secondly, local 
culture is closed towards organisations from outside the area; the economy in the mountain 
rural areas is strongly based on agriculture and this sector in South Tyrol is very peculiar: to 
deal with these customers, banks needs specific skills and local expertise that national banks do 
not possess. Consequently, the larger banks limit the number of branches, do not enter the 
market and do not buy local banks. 
In contrast, Friuli Venezia Giulia has a very competitive banking system with 16 small 
cooperative banks called Banche di Credito Cooperativo totalling 168 branches. On average, in 
Friuli Venezia Giulia each cooperative bank has a higher number of branches and volume of 
deposits than in South Tyrol. In contrast to South Tyrol, there is competition among banks as 
two or more local co-operative banks could cover the same area. All the major national banks 
and many other large banks operate successfully in this area. As in South Tyrol, cultural and 
historical reasons account for the different banking system. The local culture is less closed 
towards organisations from outside the area and the larger banks have been developing ties 
with the area since the 1960s.  During the1980s and 1990s new banks entered the market as a 
result of acquisition of other local banks. Larger banks’ strategies in this area are very 
aggressive as, in contrast to South Tyrol, no particular local expertise is required to deal with 
rural customers. Thus, each bank operates in a variety of areas across the region and targets 
both large and small firms. 
A multi-stage dyadic methodology was adopted. By this we mean that both bank managers and 
entrepreneurs were questioned at three different stages of the data collection process.  During 
2004, interviews were held with 20 entrepreneurs and 6 bank managers to develop and validate 
the conceptual framework.  Theoretical sampling was employed to select bank managers and 
entrepreneurs for interview. They represented a variety of Raiffeisenkassen and Banche di 
Credito Cooperativo and different areas geographically and economically.  Interviews were 
conducted in the first language of the interviewee, either Italian or German. Two questionnaires 
were developed, one for bank managers and one for entrepreneurs, and a pilot study conducted 
to assess validity, understanding, reliability and operationalisation of the constructs. Following 
the pilot study, two questions with low validity were dropped and wording of other questions 
clarified. Questionnaires were developed in Italian and translated into German and English by 
bilingual native speakers and reverse translated for reliability.   
A random sample of firms was provided by each bank. A telephone survey of entrepreneurs was 
conducted in their first language, either German or Italian and following a maximum 5 
telephone calls a noteworthy 80% response rate was achieved.  A postal survey of bank 
managers collected data on the financials of each firm, the lending relationship and an 
assessment of 10 measures of ability, benevolence and integrity.  Agricultural firms were 
excluded from the sample frame because of the peculiarity of the sector: the firms are quite 
small, often only sole traders and there are a large number of part time farmers, plus the 
agricultural sector is widely supported by grants.  Complete and valid responses from both 
sources, i.e. entrepreneurs and bank managers, on all the variables included in this analysis, 
were received for 137 firms.  
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Results   
Bank managers’ opinions of each entrepreneur relating to 10 variables assessing  ability, 
benevolence and integrity aspects of trust were assessed on 5 point Likert scales where 1 was 
equal to strongly disagree and 5 equal to strongly agree.  These were entered into a principal 
components analysis to test whether they grouped together in factors which denote ability, 
benevolence and integrity. This provides a reduced number of variables for later analysis as well 
as testing the validity of the constructs.  Two variables were excluded from the analysis due to 
low validity. Results from principal components analysis of the remaining eight variables are 
presented in Table 1.  All the assumptions of the PCA model were satisfied.  Three factors were 
extracted accounting for 74% of the variance.  A high value denotes a heavy loading (influence) 
on that factor. Most of the variables had their highest loading on the factor they conceptually 
belong to, except the variable ‘The entrepreneur pays attention to the needs of his/her 
employees’ which loaded highest on ‘ability’ whilst also having a similar, but lower, loading on 
‘benevolence’.  Similarly, the variable ‘the entrepreneur is consistent in his/her behaviour and 
decisions’ also had a side loading of more than 0.5 on ‘ability’.  These results are 
understandable as ‘ability’ clearly encompasses a wide range of aspects and we might expect 
some overlap with other dimensions of trust.  This also highlights the interdependence of 
different aspects of trust and the difficulty in empirically separating constructs which may seem 
clear cut conceptually. 
  
Table 1: Ability, Benevolence, Integrity: Principal Components Analysis 
 
  Component 
  Ability Integrity Benevolence 
The entrepreneur knows very well 
the market in which she/he operates 
.768 .274 .056 
The entrepreneur is good at selecting 
the needed resources 
.823 .083 .187 
The entrepreneur is good at 
managing the resources 
.842 .173 .163 
The entrepreneur is good at 
understanding the market evolution 
.751 .336 .073 
The entrepreneur is very involved in 
the community .102 .145 .935 
The entrepreneur pays attention to 
the needs of his/her employees 
.560 .230 .480 
The entrepreneur is totally honest 
during negotiations with commercial 
partners .178 .899 .207 
The entrepreneur is consistent in 
his/her behaviour and decisions 
.555 .610 .090 
 
Eigen Value 
 4.25 0.94 0.71 
Kaiser Meyer Olkin Measure 0.871 
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity sig 0.000 
Total % of variance 73.86%    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
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Overdraft interest rates ranged from 3 to 12.75% with a sample mean of 5.64%.  The three 
factors of trust were entered into a multivariate linear regression model to test their influence 
on overdraft interest rates.  Control variables were included to hold constant the other 
influences on interest rates.  Turnover is a measure of company size and a traditional proxy for 
the riskiness of the firm.  Smaller firms are assumed to attract greater risk and therefore a 
negative association is expected with interest rates.  The length of the relationship controls for 
information asymmetries with longer relationships associated with reduced information 
asymmetries.  A negative relationship is thus expected with length of relationship.   Overall 
amount of financing indicates the profit potential of the firm for the bank and therefore this is 
also expected to have a negative association with interest rates.  The three trust factors relating 
to ability, benevolence and integrity are also expected to be negatively related to interest rates 
with higher levels of trust leading to lower interest rates.   
The results of this test are reported in Table 2.  Model statistics are all satisfactory with a 
significant F test, R squared of 0.207 and tests for multi-collinearity showing tolerances of 0.74 
or above.  The results show that all the variables attract the expected signs except the 
‘benevolence’ factor score.   
Lower interest rates appear to be associated with higher turnover, longer relationships, higher 
overall financing and an increased perception of ability and integrity.  However, integrity is not 
significant in the equation and the standardized coefficient highlights that this variable 
contributes very little explanatory value.  This suggests that integrity of the entrepreneur is not 
a relevant factor in determining overdraft interest rates.  So whilst it could be assumed that 
honesty is seen as a good thing, it does not appear to affect this particular lending outcome.  
The other variables with negative signs are all significant at the level of 10% or less indicating 
that they are associated with the level of interest rates.  Benevolence attracts a positive sign in 
contrast to expectations.  On further investigation it can be seen that the benevolence factor is 
most heavily influenced by the variable representing the entrepreneur’s involvement in the 
community.  Contrary to predictions this result indicates that involvement in the community 
appears to be viewed negatively by the bank manager in determining a firm’s lending 
outcomes.  This is an area which warrants further investigation but we suggest that it could be 
perceived that heavy involvement in the community detracts from an entrepreneur’s 
commitment to managing their firm.  All the reported relationships were stable and levels of 
significance similar across a number of different estimations of the model which indicates 
robustness of results. 
 
Table 2: Multivariate Regression: Dependent Variable Overdraft Interest Rate 
 
  Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Collinearity Statistics 
  B Std. 
Error 
Beta     Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 6.482 .243   26.627 .000     
Turnover Last year  -2.391E-07 .000 -.253 -3.129 .002 .936 1.069 
Length of relationship 
with the firm 
-.036 .013 -.246 -2.720 .007 .746 1.340 
Overall amount of 
financing provided to 
the firm 
-3.596E-07 .000 -.145 -1.700 .092 .842 1.187 
ABILITY  
factor score   
-.299 .145 -.171 -2.067 .041 .895 1.118 
INTEGRITY  
factor score  
-.003 .133 -.002 -.020 .984 .857 1.167 
BENEVOLENCE factor 
score 
.223 .149 .119 1.493 .138 .954 1.048 
R squared  =  0.207;   F = 5.64 (sig 0.000) 
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Conclusion 
To summarise, trust is a key element in the entrepreneur bank relationship, providing the 
opportunity to reduce agency costs.  In assessing all the different sources of information bank 
managers are making a decision on the trustworthiness of the entrepreneur with regard to their 
ability, benevolence and integrity.  Following a very rigorous methodology our analysis indicated 
that the ability of the entrepreneur is the most important factor in the decision to trust an 
entrepreneur and this was reflected in lower interest rates.  The integrity of the entrepreneur 
appears to be much less important, but this is also a much more difficult concept to assess.  
Benevolence had the opposite effect to that predicted but we believe that this can be explained 
by considering the main predictor of this factor, i.e. community involvement.  High levels of 
community involvement could be seen as detrimental to the effective management of the firm.   
 
Implications for Entrepreneurs and Banks 
 
It is clear that high levels of trust can reduce agency costs. From the bank’s point of view trust 
mitigates adverse selection and moral hazard, reduces screening and monitoring costs and this 
will lead to increased profits.  For the entrepreneur it would require less effort spent on 
providing information for bank monitoring purposes and less requirement for collateral, which is 
often a sticking point in practice.  It should be noted that trust is not some airy fairy notion 
which is nice to have but that bestowing trust actually increases trustworthy behaviour in the 
other party and a spiral of trust ensues.  Entrepreneurs who perceive that high levels of trust 
are being placed on them are more likely to act in a trustworthy manner and thus ceteris 
paribus, the likelihood of moral hazard and/or loan default is lessened.  The interviews 
undertaken here also highlighted the two-way nature of trust and showed that a lack of trust 
can exist on the part of entrepreneurs and can make them less likely to behave in a trustworthy 
manner.  Banks and entrepreneurs should consider ways of strengthening their relationship in 
order to develop a deeper trust which will benefit both parties.   
Entrepreneurs and advisers should note that a similar conceptual framework can be applied to 
other investment decisions such as business angels or venture capitalists.  It would be 
interesting to compare and contrast the validity in these alternative contexts.  
 
Implications for Future Research 
 
Clearly, this is an area which requires further research to tease out the complex influences and 
causal effects.  The constructs we used were derived from previous studies in the trust 
literature.  Our results highlight the need to test constructs in a variety of contexts and cultures 
to assess their validity.   
Longitudinal case studies would provide additional insights into how decisions are made, where 
attitudes and relationships change and the factors that influence them.  Examination of 
individual cases throughout the lending decision process would reveal detailed information on 
negotiation behaviour, the development or breakdown of relationships and trust, outcomes and 
ex post behaviour.  This paper focused on a particular region of Italy which had an interesting 
and contrasting banking system. Future studies might explore these issues theoretically and 
empirically in comparative contexts.  Alternative banking systems and cultures should be 
studied.  The conceptual framework presented here may also be tested in alternative 
investment decisions, such as those of business angels or venture capitalists.  
 
Overall, we would suggest that the evidence and theory development presented in this paper 
indicate that the entrepreneur’s bank relationship is an important topic for future research and 
further studies should be encouraged.  It would be especially interesting to examine the 
assessment of an entrepreneur’s integrity which was not shown to be influential in this study. 
“Honesty is praised and left to shiver” Juvenal 
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